, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also …

We propose a dynamic auction mechanism for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods. These goods … the auction, the auctioneer announces the current prices for all items, bidders respond by reporting their demands at … their market power, this dynamic auction always induces the bidders to bid truthfully as price-takers, yields an efficient …

. This paper argues that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any public … before the auction itself takes place. …

generalized second price auctions. However, such an auction or mechanism could be considered unfair if similar consumers are … assignment can improve fairness while improving efficiency in some circumstances. …

the approach in second-price and first-price auctions, we establish our main result that there is no efficient auction in …

-of these markets. Allowing for general fee structures, we show that their impact on incentives and efficiency in large Double … than the Double Auction. …