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Elections, contracts and markets
Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2006 - This version: May 2006
As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may pander to public opinion. To solve this problem, we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003459198
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Vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing
Müller, Markus - 2009 - This version: July 2009
We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746240
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Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics
Gersbach, Hans; Ponta, Oriana - 2012
officeholder’s party in the next election. This system increases social welfare by letting officeholders self-select into those …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009552904
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Electoral rentierism? : the cross-national and subnational effect of oil on electoral competitiveness in multiparty autocracies
Wahman, Michael; Basedau, Matthias - 2015
1975 - 2010, and subnationally, using a new data set on subnational election results and oil production in Nigeria. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010512547
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Institutional change and legitimacy via urban elections? : people's awareness of elections and participation in Urban neighbourhoods (Shequ)
Heberer, Thomas - 2006
This paper analyses institutional reforms and political participation, most notably indirect and direct elections of residential committees (RC), in China's urban neighbourhoods and communities (shequ). It shows that these elections at present are not meaningful to the majority of city dwellers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010512674
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Paramilitaries and electoral support
Tribín Uribe, Ana María - In: Peace economics, peace science and public policy 21 (2015) 2, pp. 191-216
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513503
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Mass media, instrumental information, and electoral accountability
Bruns, Christian; Himmler, Oliver - 2016
Journalism is widely believed to be crucial for holding elected officials accountable. At the same time economic theory has a hard time providing an instrumental explanation for the existence of "accountability journalism". According to the common Downsian reasoning, rational voters should not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416918
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Lexicographic voting : holding parties accountable in the presence of Downsian competition
Klingelhöfer, Jan - In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy 15 (2015) 4, pp. 1867-1892
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011429386
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A case for standard theory?
Kuzmics, Christoph; Rodenburger, Daniel - 2015
Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229
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Voter confirmation bias and electoral accountability
Lockwood, Ben - 2015 - First version: 8 February 2015, This version: 7 June 2015
political agency setting. In the baseline two-period case where only the politician's actions are observable before the election … probability before the election (Maskin and Tirole's "feedback" case). In the three-period case, with two elections, the dynamic … evolution of confirmation bias can lead to more pandering before the first election. Finally, we show that when confirmation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492