We analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long-run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run,...

A detailed proposal for an economy-wide emissions trading scheme in Australia was tabled by the government in December 2008 with a proposed start date for mid-2010. The government proposes unilateral linking, with no initial bilateral linkages, through the clean development mechanism and joint...

This paper investigates the behavioural implications of penalty designs on market performance using an experimental method. Three penalty types and two penalty levels are enforced in a laboratory permit market with auctioning, including the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme proposed...

This paper employs a theoretical model to examine compliance incentives and market efficiency under three penalty types: the fixed penalty rate, which uses a constant marginal financial penalty; the make-good provision (quantity penalty), where each missing permit in the current period is to be...

The allocation of permits is an important design aspect of an emissions trading scheme. Traditionally, governments have favoured the free allocation of greenhouse gas permits based on individual historical emissions (‘grandfathering’) or industry benchmark data. Particularly in the European...

This report analyses the interaction of the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)and the German and Polish electricity markets along two main questions: How do EU ETS design features affect the environmental effectiveness of the system and the quality of the carbon price signal? How do...