Showing 1 - 5 of 5
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599469
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689312
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209872
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. The authors characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518880
This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561926