Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the …

This chapter presents developments in the theory of stochastic games that have taken place in recent years. It … complements the contribution by Mertens. Major emphasis is put on stochastic games with finite state and action sets. In the zero … all discount factors close to zero. Extensions to non-zero-sum games are dealt with here. In particular, the proof of …

games. An infinite time interval is considered here. Three types of future expectations were considered: a simple dynamic …

game theory, this module was limited to two persons and zero sum games. Zero sum means that the sum of the losses of one … player must equal the sum of the games of the other player. In a pure strategy game, strategies for the players can be …

properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the …