We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, we assume that agents follow a rule of "switching to better strategies more likely". We relate...

In this paper, we study a two-stage location-then-price game where consumers are distributed piecewise uniformly, each piece being referred to as an interval.Although the firms face a coordination problem, it is obvious that, for any given locations and prices, there is a unique indifferent...

In this paper, we analyze a variant of the standard Hotelling model of spatial competition where firms first choose locations along the line and then, given these locations, compete in prices.Consumers have a finite reservation price and incur a quadratic transportation cost.We show that there...

We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in multicriteria games based on consistency.Axiomatizations of the Nash equilibrium concept by Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) have immediate generalizations.The axiomatization of Norde et al.(1996) cannot be...

This paper introduces a new perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We study a retail economy where shopping hours have been deregulated recently. It is argued that first, the deregulation leads to a coordination problem between store...