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Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
Rozzi, Roberto - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-29
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent's group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200115
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The evolution of conventions under incomplete information
Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen; Jensen, Mogens; Sloth, Birgitte - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1997
We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit of Young (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi- strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772120
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Network Externality and Convention
Wärneryd, Karl - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1997
This is a dictionary entry forthcoming in Peter Newman, ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, London: Macmillan, 1998.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423820
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Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
Rozzi, Roberto - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-29
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547862
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Evolution of Individual Preferences and Persistence of Family Rules
Cigno, Alessandro; Gioffré, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2019
preference evolution? We show that it is in a couple's common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012059103
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Evolution of Individual Preferences and Persistence of Family Rules
Cigno, Alessandro; Gioffré, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2020
preference evolution? We show that it is in a couple's common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314863
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Evolution of individual preferences and persistence of family rules
Cigno, Alessandro; Gioffré, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2019
preference evolution? We show that it is in a couple's common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012019313
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Evolution of individual preferences and persistence of family rules
Cigno, Alessandro; Gioffré, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2020
preference evolution? We show that it is in a couple's common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012291871
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Global power shifts and the future of democracy: An evolutionary approach, with special attention to China
Owen, John M. - 2016
general questions concerning the regional and global waxing and waning of domestic regime types. Evolution's claims about the … co-evolution and niche construction are crucial: an agent may modify its environment such that one or more traits of that … agent enjoy a greater reproductive advantage. Agency, then, may be not an escape from evolution but a participation in co-evolution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596791
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Global power shifts and the future of democracy : an evolutionary approach, with special attention to China
Owen, John M. - 2016
general questions concerning the regional and global waxing and waning of domestic regime types. Evolution's claims about the … co-evolution and niche construction are crucial: an agent may modify its environment such that one or more traits of that … agent enjoy a greater reproductive advantage. Agency, then, may be not an escape from evolution but a participation in co-evolution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590640