We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics - pairwise comparison dynamics - under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent’s current strategy. We prove that all such...

A product set of strategies is a p-best response set if for each agent it contains all best responses to any distribution placing at least probability p on his opponents' profiles belonging to the product set. A p-best response set is minimal if it does not properly contain another p-best...

We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics - pairwise comparison dynamics - under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent's current strategy. We prove that all such dynamics...

We present a dynamic analysis of the evolution of preferences in a strategic environment. In our model, each player's behavior depends upon both the game's payoffs and his idiosyncratic biases, but only the game's payoffs determine his evolutionary success. Dynamics run at two speeds at once:...

A population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game. Players update their strategies by sampling the behavior of k opponents and playing a best response to the distribution of strategies in the sample. Suppose the game possesses a ${1 \over k}$-dominant strategy which is...

We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics — <em>pairwise comparison dynamics</em> — under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent’s current strategy. We prove that all such...