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Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin, however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822220
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Social Reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated and do not condition intervention on potential future payoffs, revenge, or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823004
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Norm enforcement: anger, indignation or reciprocity?
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2005
The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin, however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267624
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Social Reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2004
reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated and do not condition intervention on potential future payoffs, revenge, or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271935
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Can Charitable Appeals Identify and Exploit Belief Heterogeneity?
Drouvelis, Michalis; Marx, Benjamin M. - 2021
Charitable fundraisers frequently announce giving by others, and research shows that this can increase donations. However, this mechanism may not put information about peers to the most efficient use if it is costly to inform individuals who are indifferent to peer actions or causes some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493001
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Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms
Matthews, Peter; Carpenter, Jeffrey - 2002
people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best. We also show that social reciprocity can evolve in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190078
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Social Reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter - 2002
personal cost, for the violation of a widely-held norm (for example, don’t free ride). Social reciprocity differs from … reciprocity because social reciprocators punish all norm violators, regardless of group affiliation or whether or not the punisher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196526
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Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter; Ong'ong'a, Okomboli - 2003
theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636248
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Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2005
The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin, however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636286
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Social Reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2004
reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated and do not condition intervention on potential future payoffs, revenge, or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636290