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Network architecture and mutual monitoring in public goods experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - 2010
Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and … punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when individuals can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278606
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Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and … punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when individuals can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693833
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Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011
experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325937
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On self-serving strategic beliefs
Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, … - 2019
We experimentally study settings where an individual may have an incentive to adopt negative beliefs about another's intentions in order to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study uses a game in which a player can take money from an opponent in order to prevent the opponent from subsequently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993805
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On Self-Serving Strategic Beliefs
Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, … - 2019
We experimentally study settings where an individual may have an incentive to adopt negative beliefs about another’s intentions in order to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study uses a game in which a player can take money from an opponent in order to prevent the opponent from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018208
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On the Effects of Group Identity in Strategic Environments
Le Coq, Chloé; Tremewan, James; Wagner, Alexander K. - 2014
We examine differences in behavior between subjects interacting with a member of either the same or different identity group in both a centipede game and a series of stag hunt games. We find evidence that subjects interacting with outgroup members are more likely to behave as though...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110651
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Three very simple games and what it takes to solve them
Rydval, Ondřej; Ortmann, Andreas; Ostatnický, Michal - 2007
We study the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games, featuring two or three players choosing among two or three strategies. We examine how subjects' reported reasoning translates into their choices and beliefs about others' choices, and how reasoning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276436
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Signaling without common prior: An experiment
Drouvelis, Michalis; Müller, Wieland; Possajennikov, Alex - 2009
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277488
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Public statistics and private experience: Varying feedback information in a take-or-pass game
Danz, David Nils; Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe - 2015
We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011437972
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Strategic communication: An experimental investigation
Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369309