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Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? : evidence from a laboratory experiment
Fochmann, Martin; Jahnke, Björn; Wagener, Andreas - 2016
Reliable institutions - i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep - foment cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430174
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Entry or exit? : the effect of voluntary participation on cooperation
Nosenzo, Daniele; Tufano, Fabio - 2015
We study the effects of voluntary participation on public good provision. Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through two mechanisms: an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit mechanism, whereby the opportunity to leave the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504597
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Voluntary contributions to the establishment and operation of public goods : theory and experimental evidence
Arbel, Yuval; Bar-El, Ronen; Schwarz, Mordechai E.; … - 2014
We study the dynamics of the private provision of a public good that requires both capacity buildup and ongoing operating costs. We show that setting a time limit for the collection of contributions dedicated to capacity buildup minimizes the utility loss at the Nash equilibrium. We test the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413626
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All it takes is one : the effect of weakest-link and summation aggregation on public good provision under threshold uncertainty
Carlsson, Frederik; Ek, Claes; Lange, Andreas - 2021
We report experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods under threshold uncertainty. By explicitly comparing two prominent technologies, summation and weakest link, we show that uncertainty is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012696938
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To what do people contribute? : ongoing operations vs. sustainable supplies
Arbel, Yuval; Bar-El, Ronen; Schwarz, Mordechai E.; … - 2019
Attempts to curb illegal activity through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. Economic theory suggests that conducting audits on a predictable schedule, and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency, can undermine the effectiveness of audits. We conduct a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985963
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Rank-order competition in the voluntary provision of impure public goods
Angelovski, Andrej; Neugebauer, Tibor; Servátka, Maroš - 2019
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free-riding in impure public goods. In our Rank-Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064430
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Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?
Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine - 2006 - This version: 2006-11-20
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350382
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All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms
Duffy, John; Matros, Alexander - Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh - 2011
contributions are refunded. We prove that in this provisional fixed prize setting, lotteries can outperform all-pay auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878537
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An Experimental Test of Precautionary Bidding
Pahlke, Julius; Kocher, Martin; Trautmann, Stefan T. - 2010
Auctions often involve goods exhibiting a common knowledge ex-post risk that is independent of buyers' private values … bidding with data from the field seems almost impossible. We conduct experimental first-price auctions that allow us to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276866
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Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion: Bribes, signals and selection
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2014
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in firstprice (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478916