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In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422172
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112740
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787979
-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than … teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However we observe no … difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we claim that the observed difference can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012504525
In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592986
-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than … teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However we observe no … difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we claim that the observed difference can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500699
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112503
Combinatorial auctions, in particular core-selecting auctions, have increasingly attracted the attention of academics … and practitioners. We experimentally analyze core-selecting auctions under incomplete information and find that they … perform better than the Vickrey auction. The proportions of efficient allocations are similar in both types of auctions, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011834032
The targeted design of auctions has to take behavioral regularities into account. This paper explores whether …-bid auction and three di erent descending-clock auctions. We assume that a bidder's willingness-to-accept exceeds his willingness … mechanisms influence the reference state and that auctions that foster reference-state shifts lead to lower payments for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012150725
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787201