In an in influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) found that worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him. They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...

In an influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) find that "worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him". They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...

In an influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) find that "worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him". They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...

In an in influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) found that "worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him." They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...

In an in influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) found that worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him. They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...

In an influential study, Mas and Moretti (2009) find that “worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him”. They interpret this as evidence that social pressure can reduce free riding. In this paper we report an attempt to...

One acclaimed role of managers is to monitor workers in team production processes and discipline them through the threat of terminating them from the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We extend a standard weakest link experiment with a manager that can decide to replace some of her team members...

We experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes. Theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side, in which senders either use costless messages, money, or a combination of the two....

In the labor market, statistical discrimination occurs when employers' beliefs about workers' behavior induce different groups of workers to invest at different rates in their education. Thus, even though groups may be identical ex-ante, the beliefs of the employers are self-fulfilling....

We test whether anchoring affects people's elicited valuations for a bottle of wine in individual decision making and in markets. We anchor subjects by asking them if they are willing to sell a bottle of wine for a transparently uninformative random price. We elicit subjects'...