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An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

Jandoc, Karl Robert L.; Juarez, Ruben - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/31, pp. 1-32

We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other … agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We … conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062323

Greedy and selfish? : differences in fairness preferences of prospective lawyers and managers

Mertins, Vanessa; Warning, Susanne - In: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung : ZfP 28 (2014) 4, pp. 410-431

. Empirical evidence, however, is sparse. Using data from an experiment with 359 law and business administration students, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011299882

Equity versus efficiency? : evidence from three-person generosity experiments

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Bäker, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 89-102

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751380

A tale of two tails : preferences of neutral third-parties in three-player ultimatum games

Bosch-Rosa, Ciril - 2014 - First version: 13/2/2011, This Version: 31/10/2013

We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The offer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy pro le of a neutral third-party whose payoffs are independent from his decisions. If the offer is accepted the split...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010413243