For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor …

treatment. After the real effort task subjects were asked to state their retrospective beliefs about their performance in public …

. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash … strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We …

making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best … reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy and equilibrium payoffs are not too unequal. Using a mixture model we …

For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor of whether …

update their beliefs about the probability of being audited, both before and after audits are definitely withdrawn. We find … that when individuals have initially experienced systematic audits, they decrease both their beliefs and their … irregular, they maintain high beliefs about the probability of being audited and continue cooperating long after audits have …

. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash … strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We …