The following study investigates whether or not self-selection into organizations fosters performance in working groups by aligning mission preferences. The experimental design that allows us to study the causal relationship between self-selection, incentives and performance is based on a...

We examine bidding motives in discrete-point unique bid auctions in a laboratory setting. In lowest (highest) unique bid auctions, the participant with the lowest (highest) unique bid wins the auction. We posit two sets of motives in this type of auctions - a winning motive that is driven by the...

The following study investigates whether or not self-selection into organizations fosters performance in working groups by aligning mission preferences. The experimental design that allows us to study the causal relationship between self-selection, incentives and performance is based on a...

We examine bidding motives in discrete-point unique bid auctions in a laboratory setting. In lowest (highest) unique bid auctions, the participant with the lowest (highest) unique bid wins the auction. We posit two sets of motives in this type of auctions - a winning motive that is driven by the...