We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding … in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the …

overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …In this paper we use an experiment to compare a theory of risk aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …

Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending …-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than …

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we … confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation … between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial …

Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We … study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills …. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive … ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account … cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

auction with an additional buyer is conducted. The theoretical model predicts that with risk neutral agents all sales take … place in the auction rendering the negotiation prior to the auction obsolete. An experimental test of the model provides …

than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to reciprocate the spiteful overbidding of the lower value bidders … overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending … price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not …