This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...

We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become...

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and selfselection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their behavioral relevance. Here we present a method integrating interactive experiments and...

We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become...

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and self-selection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their behavioral relevance. Here we present a method integrating interactive experiments and...

This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...

Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and selfselection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their behavioral relevance. Here we present a method integrating interactive experiments and...

This paper investigates the effect of interest rate policy on stock marketbubbles and trading behavior in experimental asset markets. For this purpose, weintroduce the possibility of investing in interest bearing bonds to the classicallaboratory asset market design of Smith, Suchanek, and...

We investigate the role of affect and deliberation on social preferences. In ourlaboratory experiment subjects decide on a series of mini Dictator games while they are undervarying degrees of cognitive load. The cognitive load is intended to decrease deliberation andtherefore enhance the...

Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in anexperiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate thisdecision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and thedelegate, we find that the...