This research note reports the results of a follow-up experiment conducted to validate an earlier experiment showing that if taxpayers overestimate the prevalence of tax evasion, their voluntary compliance can be increased by informing them about the true rate of cheating. The result confirms...

Corruption as social phenomenon is studied by a variety of disciplines?? anthropology, criminology, development theory, economics, political science, psychology, sociology. Each of them has developed its own scientific traditions associated with different methods of collecting and analyzing...

„Reflection effect“ means, that people are risk averse if dealing with profits and risk seeking by challenging losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The aim of the paper is to find out whether the decisions of the experiment participants differ when dealing with positive and negative...

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the...

The strategy method is becoming an important tool in experimentalmethodology. This study examines how well this method works in anindividual decision experiment. Subjects are faced with a sequentialsearch problem. After extensive practice solving the problem andformulating strategies, they play...

Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion...

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...

We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become...

The current study examines individual decision making in the field of personal finance. A laboratory experiment investigates the way naïve advice influences the decisionmaking process. When advice is offered on demand, participants prefer expert over naïve advice. Although naïve advice is...