We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold...

This paper studies whether collusion occurs in three-bidder three-object second-price hard-close auctions. The experimental results of two laboratory treatments are reported. The first one, the anonymity treatment, involves subject groups that can trace decisions to the bidder under conditions...

The tension between cooperation and competition that characterizes many business relationships is experimentally studied in a 'pie'-creation game; value is created and increased through cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. At the end, the player with the greater stake in the joint...

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold...

The tension between cooperation and competition that characterizes many business " relationships is experimentally studied in a “pie”-creation game; value is created and" increased through cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. At the end, the player with the greater stake in...

This paper studies whether collusion occurs in three-bidder three-object second-price hard-close auctions. The experimental results of two laboratory treatments are reported. The first one, the anonymity treatment,involves subject groups which can trace decisions to the bidder under conditions...

The recent literature suggests that people have social preferences with a self-serving bias. Our data analysis reveals that the stylized fact of declining cooperation in repeated public goods experiments results from this bias and adaptation.

We study collusion in the finitely repeated, hard-close auction experiment. Three subjects, identified by their bidder name, simultaneously compete in three auction markets. Due to the experimental design, subjects are enabled to the sharing of the benefits of cooperation by coordinating their...

Experimental and empirical evidence identifies the existence of socialpreferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. In this paper, wefurther examine one such social preference: conditional cooperation. We run threeexperimental public goods games, the traditional voluntary...

Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional...