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We investigate the effect of punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity in which the investor may punish … the allocator at a cost. Our results indicate that the effect of the punishment crucially depends on the investor …’s capacity of punishment, that is measured in our experiment by the proportion of the allocator’s payoffs that the investor can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010684835
In three distinct disciplines, crime and punishment are studied experimentally: in empirical legal studies, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455955
less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects … themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266976
In three distinct disciplines, crime and punishment are studied experimentally: in empirical legal studies, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522112
less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects … themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008567631
Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions for helping sustain trust in markets, while feedback information is usually considered a public good. We apply both theoretical models and experiments to study how raters' feedback behavior responds to different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008560983
Group membership increases cooperation in social dilemma games, altruistic donation in dictator games, and fair offers in ultimatum games. While the empirical study of group action has grown rapidly over the years, there is little agreement at the theoretical level on exactly why and how group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460113
We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals' information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328802
This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200110
This paper investigates the effect of different communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping in a helping situation. Four treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to solicit unincentivized cooperation, i.e., face-to-face, phone call and two different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435265