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Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Engelmann, Dirk - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
Punishing free riders might promote cooperation, but it can also lead to feuds. We use a public good game with … punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to … feuds. While the possibility of a feud a¤ects punishment and contribution patterns, total earnings are not signi?cantly di …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574884
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Simultaneous and sequential contributions to step-level public goods: One vs. two provision levels
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rau, Holger A. - 2014
In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) affects public-good provision in a two-player game. We find that the sequential order of moves significantly improves public-good provision and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333112
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Simultaneous and sequential contributions to step-level public goods: One vs. two provision levels
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rau, Holger A. - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2014
In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the number of step levels (one vs. two) affects public-good provision in a two-player game. We find that the sequential order of moves significantly improves public-good provision and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956723
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Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study
Søberg, Morten - 2002
This paper reports on recurring laboratory elections in which buyers and sellers choose institutional rules to govern a subsequent trading round. The bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction (sellers suggest prices) and double auction (both trader types initiate price quotes) make up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284388
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Organisational structure, communication and group ethics
Ellman, Matthew; Pezanis-Christou, Paul - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007
This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547180
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Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study
Søberg, Morten - Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Government of Norway - 2002
This paper reports on recurring laboratory elections in which buyers and sellers choose institutional rules to govern a subsequent trading round. The bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction (sellers suggest prices) and double auction (both trader types initiate price quotes) make up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980852
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Organisational structure, communication and group ethics
Ellman, Matthew; Pezanis-Christou, Paul - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007
This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168458
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Endogenous Market Institutions: Experimental Evidence
Søberg, Morten - In: Nordic Journal of Political Economy 30 (2004), pp. 91-119
A wide variety of market institutions exist in the field and on the Internet. Examples are English auctions and two-sided marketplaces like the double auction where both buyers and sellers initiate prices. This paper investigates how the emergence of (different) market institutions is shaped by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005538909
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Voting rules and endogenous trading institutions: An experimental study
Søberg, Martin - Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo - 2003
This paper reports on recurring laboratory elections in which buyers and sellers choose institutional rules to govern a subsequent trading round. The bid auction (buyers propose prices), offer auction (sellers suggest prices) and double auction (both trader types initiate price quotes) make up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652131
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Rules, Rule-Following, and Cooperation
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Vostroknutov, Alexander - Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University - 2012
Rules are thought to persist to the extent that the direct benefits of having them (e.g. reduced transactions costs) exceed the costs of enforcement and of occasional misapplications. We argue that a second crucial role of rules is as screening mechanisms for identifying cooperative types. Thus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818176