Showing 1 - 7 of 7
This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008691589
This paper aims to analize the role of personal identity in decision making. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032019
This paper aims to analize the role of personal identity in decision making. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263784
Published as article in: Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 261-275.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651090
This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364531
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444314
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434323