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Trust is measured using both survey questions and a standard trust experiment among a random sample of Muslim and Hindu … trust experiment in terms of fractions sent or returned, but the responses to the survey questions do indicate significant … differences. Hindus, the minority, trust other people less in general, while Hindus trust Muslims more than Muslims trust Hindus. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005767551
Levels of trust are measured by asking standard survey questions on trust and by observing the behaviour in a trust … game using a random sample in rural Bangladesh. Follow-up questions and correlations between the sent amount in the trust … game and stated expectations reveal that the amount sent in the trust game is a weak measure of trust. The fear of future …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651660
Trust is measured using both survey questions and a standard trust experiment using a random sample of individuals in … rural Bangladesh. We found no significant effect of the social distance between Hindus and Muslims in the trust experiment …: Hindus, the minority, trust other people less in general, and Hindus trust Muslims more than the other way around. <p> …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651692
In a trust game conducted in rural Bangladesh, the proportion of money sent decreased significantly with the stake size …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651791
This paper investigates whether expectations of trustworthiness and resulting acts of trust accord with an objective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009642445
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009642690
An economic experiment involving separate sessions in 24 small, tightly knit communities reveals that trust is higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604976
general population. In contrast with the literature on in-group favoritism, we find that workers trust their colleagues less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699660
We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267460
We provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take social preferences, a concern for the outcomes achieved by other reference agents, seriously. Although we show that student measures of social preference elicited in an experiment have little external validity when compared to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267470