We study the welfare properties of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard that encompasses incentive mechanisms for bank risk-taking studied in a large partial equilibrium literature. We show that competitive equilibriums maximize welfare and yield an optimal level of banks' risk...

This paper uses a toy financial system to study systemic risk in scale-free interbank networks. Networks are produced according to a fitness algorithm, combined with a representation of the balance sheets of the banks. Our generating processes for interbank networks are designed in a way to...

This paper studies German bank lending during the Asian and Russian crises, using a bank level data set, which has been compiled from credit data at the Deutsche Bundesbank. Our aim is to gain more insight into the pattern of German bank lending during financial crises in emerging markets. We...

This paper assesses the impact of a certain structure of interbank exposures on the stability of a stylized financial system. Given a certain balance sheet structure of financial institutions, a large number of valid matrices of interbank exposures is created by a random generator. Assuming a...

A low interest rate environment can pose a key risk to the life insurance sector. A deteriorating return on investment holdings jeopardizes the guaranteed return on life insurance contracts. In this paper, we examine the effect of low interest rates on German life insurers by applying various...

While net settlement systems make more efficient use of liquidity than gross settlement systems, they are known to generate systemic risk. What does that tendency imply for the stability of the payments [or financial] system when the two settlement systems coexist? Do liquidity shortages induce...

This paper develops a model to analyze two different bad bank schemes, an outright sale of toxic assets to a state-owned bad bank and a repurchase agreement between the bad bank and the initial bank. For both schemes, we derive a critical transfer payment that induces a bank manager to...

We merge a financial market model with leverage-constrained, heterogeneous agents with a reduced-form version of the New-Keynesian standard model. Agents in both submodels are assumed to be boundedly rational. The fi nancial market model produces endogenously arising boom-bust cycles. It is also...

We use a classic Merton credit risk framework to argue that Islamic Banking Institutions (IBIs) face less incentive to take on risks than Conventional Banking Institutions (CBI). IBIs have less incentive for risk shifting both in and outside of distress situations. We test and confirm this...

This paper contributes to the debate of whether central banks can \lean against the wind" of emerging stock or house price bubbles. Against this background, the paper evaluates if new advances in real-time bubble detection, as brought forward by Phillips et al. (2011), can timely detect bubble...