A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games statesthat if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a uniquesubgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which theequilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here Ishow that this...

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. Weshow that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game hasa pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game.Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule \imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. Weprovide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and showthat it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workersagainst a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences andhelps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments findsick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. Butsick-pay is not without its...

In this paper we model the adjustment process of European Union Allowance(EUA) prices to the releases of announcements at high-frequency controlling forintraday periodicity, volatility clustering and volatility persistence. We ¯nd thatthe high-frequency EUA price dynamics are very well captured...

It is difficult to disagree with Vernon Smith's (2010) assessment of thestate of the art in experimental economics. It is informed by the experienceof someone who was there, right at the beginning of experimental economics.Some of the problems he discusses, like the frequent failure of backward...

Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium providesgood predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however,actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attributethe robust deviations...