Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...

According to Alfred Korzybski (1921) humans unlike plants and animals have the property to bind time, i.e. they are able to transfer experience through time. Humans are capable to collenct knowledge from the past and communicate their knowledge to the future. This paper investigates the...

We analyze the behavior of electricity generation groups that make investment and production decisions in a liberalized market scenario by introducing long-term contracts, in a context where there is a high level of market concentration. In this way, a dynamic deterministic model of imperfect...

The invasion by the spreading species is one of the most serious threats to biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. Despite a number of empirical and theoretical studies, there is still no general model about why or when settlement becomes invasion. The purpose of this work is to test a model of...

We analyze the behavior of electricity generation groups that make investment and production decisions in a liberalized market scenario by introducing long-term contracts, in a context where there is a high level of market concentration. In this way, a dynamic deterministic model of imperfect...

During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped tobring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics.Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choicetradition – and, indirectly, of behaviorism – we...

Dieser Beitrag erweitert die Standardmodellierung der Literatur über Informationsaustausch zwischen Unternehmen bei Nachfrageunsicherheit und läßt sich vor allem auf Unternehmen in neuen Branchen oder in unsicheren Märkten anwenden ...

We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the trulyevolutionarily stable state (TESS) and the generalized evolutionarilystable equilibrium (GESE). The GESE generalizes the evolutionar-ily stable equilibrium (ESE) of Joosten [1996]. An ESE attracts allnearby trajectories...