Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games (Rubinstein, 2007; Rubinstein, 2016). We leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on...

Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games (Rubinstein, 2007; Rubinstein, 2016). We leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on...

Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games. In this paper, we leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they...

We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However,...

Our purpose is to show how large difference of beliefs induced by fear of crashesis amenable to large and persistent price responses to contemporaneous shocks. Weconstruct a pure exchange economy populated by two agents who estimate strictlydifferent models regarding the fundamental. In...

This paper presents an equilibrium model in a pure exchange economywhen investors have three possible sources of heterogeneity. Investorsmay differ in their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion andin their time preference rate. We study the impact of investors heterogeneityon equilibrium...