We propose a theory of the interaction between knowledge and games. Epistemic game theory is of course a well-developed subject but there is also a need for a theory of how some agents can affect the outcome of a game by affecting the knowledge which other agents have and thereby affecting their...

This book offers a rigorous, concise, and nontechnical introduction to some of the fundamental insights of rational choice theory. It draws on formal theories of microeconomics, decision making, games, and social choice, and on ideas developed in philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Itzhak...

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of...

It gives an informal definition of the main elements of a game: the set of players, the concept of a move and of a strategy, the normal and the extended form, a first introduction to the description of information, the set of results that can be reached and the value each player attaches to a...

A simple proof of existence of a non cooperative Nash equilibrium is briefly discussed, together with an introduction to the problems arising from its uniqueness or non uniqueness, to the properties which can be ascribed to an equilibrium and those connected with the search for an equilibrium.

The concept of a repeated game is introduced and applied to the case of the centipede, the finite and the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The consequences of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are outlined. A concept of reasonableness is introduced and some of its...

After introducing the binary relation of domination and its properties, one defines the concept of non dominated strategies and some conditions for their existence, the concept of solution of a game, that of rationalizability, that of best reply and the concept of non cooperative Nash equilibrium.

After a summary introduction to the concept of a game, it presents some of the examples more often used in the literature (head and tail, peaches and bees, traffic light, prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes and stag hunt games) with a brief discussion of the different situations and...

Logic and game theory have had a few decades of contacts by now, with the classical results of epistemic game theory as major high-lights. In this paper, we emphasize a recent new perspective toward “logical dynamics”, designing logical systems that focus on the actions that change...