Most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities. Yet, the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities. In this paper we experi- mentally investigate the effects of...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We report results of an internet experiment designed to test the theory of informational cascades in financial markets (Avery and Zemsky, AER, 1998). More than 6400 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from...

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment...

Most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities. Yet, the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities. In this paper we experi- mentally investigate the effects of...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We report results of an internet experiment designed to test the theory of informational cascades in financial markets (Avery and Zemsky, AER, 1998). More than 6400 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from...

Most real world situations which are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities. Yet, the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature focuses on pure informational externalities. In this paper we study several different forms of payoff externalities that...

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment...

Most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities. Yet, the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities. In this paper we experi- mentally investigate the effects of...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We report results of an internet experiment designed to test the theory of informational cascades in financial markets (Avery and Zemsky, AER, 1998). More than 6400 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from an...

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment...