Social learning often occurs between groups with different levels of experience. Yet little is known about the ideal behavioral rules in such contexts. Existing insights only apply when individuals learn from each other in the same group. In this paper, we close this gap and consider two groups,...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

We consider the situation in which individuals in a finite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payoff. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected...

In consectutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, obtains a payoff and then observes the performance of another agent. An agent determines future behavior based on the information she receives from the present round. She chooses among the...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

We consider the model of social learning by Schlag (1996). Individuals must repeatedly choose an action in a multi-armed bandit. We assume that each indivdiual observes the outcomes of two other individuals' choices before her own next choice must be made -- the original model only allows for...

We consider the situation in which individuals in a finite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payoff. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected...

A simple dynamic general equilibrium model is set up in which firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Firms whose productivity has fallen too low exit, and entrants try to imitate the best practice of existing firms, so that the expected productivity of entering firms is a function of...