We study the classical implementation problem when players are prone to make mis- takes. To capture the idea of … Maskin Monotonicity, and no worst alternative conditions are necessary for restricted Limiting LQRE (LLQRE) implementation …

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of the theory of … implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby … cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the …

rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …

made by auctioning rights to this position. If there is uncertainty across periods, then efficient mechanisms may involve …

We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in …

bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, characterizing the possible allocation rules …