We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixedstrategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term...

It is well known that a social choice function is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if it is incentive compatible. However, in general it is not possible to rule out other equilibrium outcomes, and additional conditions, e.g., Bayesian monotonicity, are needed to...

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixedstrategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term...

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. However, we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...

In a differential information economy with quasi–linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints : the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well–behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even...

In a differential information economy with quasi–linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints : the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well–behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even...