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Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies
Thiele, Veikko - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621240
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Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement
Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge … choice of performance measures and incentives depends on the agent’s knowledge, environmental risk, technological uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504471
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Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment : thirty years on
MacLeod, William Bentley; Malcomson, James M. - 2023
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
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Relational Incentive Contracts
Malcomson, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2010
This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts.  It motivates the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body relationship and the relationships between Japanese automobile manufacturers and their subcontractors.  It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671389
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Firing Threats and Tenure: Incentive effects and impression management
Corgnet, Brice; Hernán-Gonzalez, Roberto; Rassenti, Stephen - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
, organizations endowed with firing threats significantly underperformed those using individual incentives. Our analysis also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817444
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Resource allocation and firm scope
Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - 2006
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268001
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The Design of Incentives in the Presence of Lobbying Activity
Wessels, Joachim H. - University of Bonn, Germany - 1995
-powered incentives in the optimal contract. Secondly, complementing Itoh's findings, we conclude that even if there are no productive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968161
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Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
MacLeod, W. Bentley; Malcomson, James - 2023
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014296625
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Resource Allocation and Firm Scope
Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852
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Joint Production in Teams
Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765