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Incentives to Corporate Governance Activism
Leech, Dennis - Royal Economic Society - RES - 2003
This paper considers incentives faced by investors (financial institutions) to become actively involved in the … costs of investor activism separately, it questions the conventional wisdom -based on simplistic agency theory - that share … ownership is so widely held in the UK that such incentives are too weak for shareholder activism to be a rational basis of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005398515
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Institutional investors and ownership engagement
Çelik, Serdar; Isaksson, Mats - In: Financial market trends 105 (2013) 2, pp. 93-114
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010409787
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Institutional investors and ownership engagement
Çelik, Serdar; Isaksson, Mats - In: OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2013 (2013) 2, pp. 93-114
This article provides a framework for analysing the character and degree of ownership engagement by institutional investors.It argues that the general term “institutional investor” in itself doesn’t say very much about the quality or degree of ownership engagement. It is therefore an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011007280
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Institutional Investors as Owners: Who Are They and What Do They Do?
Çelik, Serdar; Isaksson, Mats - Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprises … - 2013
This paper provides a framework for analysing the character and degree of ownership engagement by institutional investors. It argues that the general term “institutional investor” in itself doesn’t say very much about the quality or degree of ownership engagement. It is therefore an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276718
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Interpersonal power : a review, critique, and research agenda
Sturm, Rachel E.; Antonakis, John - In: Journal of management : JOM 41 (2015) 1, pp. 136-163
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010475407
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Monotone vs. non-monotone incentive structures : an experimental analysis
Lukas, Christian - In: International journal of economics and business research 16 (2018) 1, pp. 12-34
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011990508
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Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities
Lasserre, Pierre; Soubeyran, Antoine - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1999
the proportion of aggregate production that fails to be appropriated, and the private incentives to choose productive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100938
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INCENTIVES AND STANDARDS IN AGENCY CONTRACTS
Chambers, Robert G. - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, … - 2000
identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multi-tasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005454108
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A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk
Friebel, Guido; Matros, Alexander - In: Economics of Governance 6 (2005) 2, pp. 105-111
We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages. Copyright...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005391090
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Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: temptation, and the design of executive compensation
Noe, Thomas H. - Finance Research Centre, Oxford University - 2008
This paper considers optimal compensation for a CEO who is entrusted with administering corporate assets honestly. Optimal compensation designs maximize integrity at minimum cost. These designs are very ‘low powered,’ i.e., while specifying a lower bound for performance and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005509818