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Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : on non-compete agreements in employment contracts

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006

We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371071

Contract theory in the spotlight : Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize winners

Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David - In: Revue d'économie politique 128 (2018) 4, pp. 493-533

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943020

The theory of the firm in the scientific work of Graziani

Martina, Riccardo - In: Studi economici : rivista quadrimestrale 69 (2014) 1, pp. 80-89

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011309498

Can there be too much privatization? : the role of political incentives

Fuchs, Kira; Übelmesser, Silke - In: CESifo economic studies : CESifo, a joint initiative of … 60 (2014) 4, pp. 722-746

Generally, privatization of state-owned enterprises is believed to enhance economic efficiency and competitiveness and … to improve the overall economic performance of a country. So, can there be too much privatization? We show that this … depends on the political objectives that are pursued with a privatization policy. We study two types of government: a budget …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010466697

The power of renegotiation and monitoring in software outsourcing : substitutes or complements?

Huang, He; Hu, Minhui; Kauffman, Robert J.; Xu, Hongyan - In: Information systems research : ISR 32 (2021) 4, pp. 1236-1261

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805162

Distrust : The Hidden Cost of Control

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - 2004

We show experimentally that a principal?s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent?s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents? choice set by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261958

Financial incentives and loan officer behavior : multitasking and allocation of effort under an incomplete contract

Behr, Patrick; Drexler, Alejandro; Gropp, Reint; … - 2014 - This version: July 04, 2014

In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378353

Transparency in relational contracts

Fahn, Matthias; Zanarone, Giorgio - In: Strategic management journal 43 (2022) 5, pp. 1046-1071

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013187745

Balanced scorecards : a relational contract approach

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2021

Reward systems based on balanced scorecards typically connect pay to an index, i.e. a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438700

Relational contracts in agriculture : theory and evidence

Michler, Jeffrey D.; Wu, Steven Y. - In: Annual review of resource economics 12 (2020), pp. 111-127

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012404663