Similar Search Results

Are teams less inequality averse than individuals?

He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2014

designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality … aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359304

Desert and inequity aversion in teams

Gill, David; Stone, Rebecca - 2014

of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team … inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share team output equally, desert …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404035

Team production, peer pressure, and information systems

Mohnen, Alwine; Pokorny, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - In: Arbeitsverträge : Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches …, (pp. 107-118). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761542

Efficient inequity-averse teams

Li, Jianpei - 2007

This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343934

Inequality, inequity aversion, and the provision of public goods

Kölle, Felix; Sliwka, Dirk; Zhou, Nannan - 2011

We investigate the effects of inequality in wealth on the incentives to contribute to a public good when agents are inequity averse and may differ in ability. We show that equality may lead to a reduction of public good provision below levels generated by purely selfish agents. But introducing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278642

Transparency, inequity aversion, and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams: theory and evidence

Mohnen, Alwine; Pokorny, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2008

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268881