I propose a new axiom on the aggregation of individual yes/no judgments on propositions into collective judgments: each collective judgment depends only on people's judgments on 'relevant' propositions. This contrasts with classical independence: each collective judgment depends only on people's...

This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called `scoring rules' after their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the collective judgments which reach the highest total `score' across the individuals, subject to the judgments having...

This article gives a brief and informal introduction to the theory of judgment aggregation and to the discursive dilemma, focusing on methodology and interpretation.

In this paper, the authors investigate judgment aggregation by assuming that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and the Independence condition (formula-wise aggregation) holds for them, though perhaps not for others.

All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions have one of two restrictions: they either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to special agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. An important open question is...

The widely discussed `discursive dilemma' shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of...

How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a σ-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction...

What is the relationship between degrees of belief and (all-or-nothing) beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgmentaggregation theory. Although some...

How can different individuals' probability functions on a given σ-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require `event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals'...