The paper analyzes a finite time economy with a single risky asset which pays a one-shot payoff (dividend). The payoff is random and its distribution is not known a priori. Agents observe public signals (random draws from the same distribution) and update their beliefs about the payoff. They...

We study a learning process in which subjects extrapolate from their experience of similar past strategic situations to the current decision problem. When applied to coordination games, this learning process leads to contagion of behavior from problems with extreme payoffs and unique equilibria...

In this paper, we study an imperfect monitoring model of duopoly under similar settings as in Green and Porter (1984), but here firms do not know the demand parameters and learn about them over time though the price signals. We investigate how a deviation from rational expectations affects the...

Electoral fraud has become an integral part of electoral competition both in established democracies and less-than-democratic regimes. In this paper I study electoral fraud in the non-democratic setting. First, I present evidence of fraud sustainability and growth over the lifetime of...

In the paper, I examine free entry in homogeneous product markets and its social efficiency. Previous research on free entry in homogeneous product markets has shown that under Cournot oligopoly with fixed setup costs the free entry equilibrium always delivers excessive entry. In contrast, I...

Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) subject consumption and dividends to rare disasters in the growth rate. We extend their framework and subject consumption and dividends to rare disasters in the growth persistence. Wemodel growth persistence by means of two hidden types of economic slowdowns:...

We examine a trivariate time series model that is subject to a regime switch, where the shifts are governed by an unobserved, two-state variable that follows a Markov process. The analysis is performed in a Bayesian framework developed by Albert and Chib (1993), where the unobserved states are...