We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quality of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, is increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour....

The paper proves that the Bayesian approach to learning and expectations formation implies no propositions that could conceivably be refuted by observation. For a (non-expanding) universe infinite in time but finite at any point of time, it is shown that by a suitable choice of priors, any...

The paper proves that the Bayesian approach to learning and expectations formation implies no propositions that could conceivably be refuted by observation. For a (non-expanding) universe infinite in time but finite at any point of time, it is shown that by a suitable choice of priors, any...

This paper presents experimental evidence about how individuals learn from information that comes from inside versus outside their ethnic group. In the experiment, Thai subjects observed information that came from Americans and other Thais that they could use to help them answer a series of...

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...