We study a model where agents face a continuum of two-player games and categorize them into a finite number of situations to make sense of their complex environment. Agents need not share the same categorization. Each agent can cooperate or defect, conditional on the perceived category. The...

We study a model where agents face a continuum of two-player games and categorize them into a finite number of situations to make sense of their complex environment. Agents need not share the same categorization. Each agent can cooperate or defect, conditional on the perceived category. The...

We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number n of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic...

This paper revisits a recent study by Posen and Levinthal (2012) on the exploration/exploitation tradeoff for a multi-armed bandit problem, where the reward probabilities undergo random shocks. We show that their analysis suffers two shortcomings: it assumes that learning is based on stale...