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Measuring agents' reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2010
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266086
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Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2013
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097
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Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank; Tobias - Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, … - 2013
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277277
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Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2013
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331131
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Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - HAL - 2013
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899905
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Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - CESifo - 2010
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572521
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Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2013
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011031524