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In this paper we investigate the parametric inference for the linear fractional stable motion in high and low frequency setting. The symmetric linear fractional stable motion is a three-parameter family, which constitutes a natural non-Gaussian analogue of the scaled fractional Brownian motion....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012654431
Linear fractional stable motion is a type of a stochastic integral driven by symmetric alpha-stable L´evy motion. The integral could be considered as a non-Gaussian analogue of the fractional Brownian motion. The present paper discusses R package rlfsm created for numerical procedures with the...
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This paper presents some asymptotic results for statistics of Brownian semi-stationary (BSS) processes. More precisely, we consider power variations of BSS processes, which are based on high frequency (possibly higher order) differences of the BSS model. We review the limit theory discussed in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851246
In this paper, we assume that firms can create independent divisions which compete in quantities in a homogeneous good market. Assuming complete information, identical firms and constant returns to scale, we prove the following: 1) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) implies Perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542869
LS Penrose’s limit theorem (PLT) – which is implicit in Penrose [5, p. 72] and for which he gave no rigorous proof – says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely while existing voters retain their weights and the relative quota is pegged, then...
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In general, analyses of voting power are performed through the notion of a simple voting game (SVG) in which every voter can choose between two options: 'yes' or 'no'. Felsenthal and Machover (1997) introduced the concept of ternary voting games (TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043436