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Dam, Kaniska - 2003

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507906

Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

Jackson, Matthew O.; Palfrey, Thomas R. - EconWPA - 1997

bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, characterizing the possible allocation rules …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338

Adjusting prices in the many-to-many assignment game

Sotomayor, Marilda - 2008

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284074

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129

Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems

Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726

Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance : acyclicity and dropping strategies

Tello, Benjamín - 2018

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011817201

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2012

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307931

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2012

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281521

Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental investigation

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2012

students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286341

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801