We develop a two-sided matching model to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We predict a positive assortative matching in terms of both scientific ability and affinity for type of research, but negative assortative in terms of ability on one side and affinity in the...

We analyze the optimal contract in static moral hazard situations, where the agent’s effort is not verifiable. We first present the main trade-offs of the principal-agent model. We cover the trade-off of incentives (motivation) vs. risk-sharing (efficiency), incentives vs. rents (when the...

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange,...

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...

We prove two Folk Theorems which, together with the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983)), have stimulated the development of the theory on incentives for the one-to-one two-sided matching models with money as a continuous variable.

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...

Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...