make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over … potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate …

investment behavior. The bilateral external benefits induce an investment multiplier effect. This multiplier effect depends in a … of investment and the signaling incentives induced by competition. …

properties of the equilibrium investment behavior. The bilateral external benefits induce an investment multiplier effect. This … how it interacts with other important factors such as the costs of investment and the signaling incentives induced by …

properties of the equilibrium investment behavior. The bilateral external benefits induce an investment multiplier effect. This … how it interacts with other important factors such as the costs of investment and the signaling incentives induced by …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through …