An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the directrevelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paperprovides characterizations...

We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running timeof the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. We also show that this result...

This paper is concerned with a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement mechanism called combinatorial scoring auction. In the setting that we analyze, private information of the suppliers is multi-dimensional. The buyer wants to procure several items at once. Subsets of these items are...

In this paper we present a new auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the issue concerning the information revelation requirement of this auction and the associated amount of data that needs to be transmitted. We show that in the...

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of every player is a non-empty compact convex subset of Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous and concave in player i''s own strategies. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff...

We consider networks evolving over time within an infinite-horizon dynamic setting. Transitions from one network to another are given by a stationary transition probability matrix. We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating the value of a network at any point in time among its...

Gibbard''s (1973) and Satterthwaite''s (1975) result implies that anonymous surjective social choice functions on more than two alternatives are manipulable. Placing some mild constraints on the number of agents compared to the number of alternatives, we show what the minimal number of...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

This paper assesses the significance of financing constraints in investment decisions for a balanced panel of 206 of the largest Dutch manufacturing firms over the period 1983-1996, employing split sample analysis of reduced form investment equations. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that...