Showing 1 - 10 of 12
In games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously and non-cooperatively with the same agent, standard direct revelation mechanisms in which the agent reports his type(i.e. his exogenous private information) have been proven inadequate to characterize the entire set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252337
We study second-degree price discrimination in markets where the product traded by the monopolist is access to other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the welfareand the profit-maximizing mechanisms to employ a single network or a menu of non-exclusive networks. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369125
This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and non-cooperatively with the same agent. We …first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals observe neither the mechanisms offered upstream nor the decisions taken in these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597101
These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of "bandit auctions."
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597106
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597113
These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of "bandit auctions."
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597114
This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and non-cooperatively with the same agent and provides characterization results useful for applications. Our benchmark model is one of private contracting in which downstream principals do not observe upstream...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824589
This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766894
We consider auction environments in which bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations and study the optimal selling mechanisms in such environments. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766913
This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588245