We study experimentally how players learn to make decisions if they face many different (normal-form) games. Games are generated randomly from a uniform distribution in each of 100 rounds. We find that agents do extrapolate between games but learn to play strategically equivalent games in the...

Stochastic games offer a rich mathematical structure that makes it possible to analyze situations with heterogeneous and interacting economic agents. Depending on the actions of the economic agents, the economic environment changes from one period to another. We focus on stationary equilibrium,...

We analyze a principal-agent model in which a principal has two possibilities to improve his knowledge about the quality of an investment project. First, he has access to an informationtechnology that provides a \textit{verifiable}, unbiased signal. Second, he can hire an agent who detects bad...

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the impact of temporary buy-options on efficiency, revenues, and bidding behavior in online proxy-auctions when bidders have independent private valuations. We show that the introduction of a buy-option reduces efficiency and at the same time fails to...

When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal, which provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. Price regulation can be such a Pareto improving policy, even when the welfare effects of rationing are taken into account. An appealing aspect of price...

We estimate corporate average effective tax rates from financial statements for companies domiciled in European Union (EU) member states during 7 years from 1990 to 1996. Our objective is to compare the tax rate effectively experienced by companies with the corporate statutory tax rate in the EU...

We construct an elementary mechanism (Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995)) that Nash implements the Constrained Walrasian correspondence. We extend it to incomplete and non-exclusive information economies by enlarging the message space of agents. We characterize the set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes...

We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders; they may even induce serious bankruptcy problems.

We show that delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance rates of low offers. While in standard treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, these numbers increase to around 65-75% as we delay the acceptance decisions by around 10...

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. Several papers in the literature obtain the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the unique limit of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies when...