We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, y-strategy-proofness - meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number y cannot manipulate - and unanimity, we show that such rules are...

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, y-strategy-proofness - meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number y cannot manipulate - and unanimity, we show that such rules are...

Under a k-approval scoring rule each agent attaches a score of one to his k most preferred alternatives and zero to the other alternatives. The rule assigns the set of alternatives with maximal score. Agents may extend preferences to sets in several ways: they may compare the worst alternatives,...

Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus ona new condition: "update monotonicity" for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibilitytheorems for the choice rules are based on -or related to- monotonicity conditions, this...

Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept arediscussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closerto an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requiresfurther...

The classical bankruptcy problem (O''Neill, 1982) is extended by assuming that the agents have non-homogenous preferences over several estates. A special case is the one in which there are finitely many estates and the agents have homogenous preferences, i.e., constant utilities, per estate. In...

In this paper we study the effect of information on the occurrence of intentional price wars on the equilibrium path. An episode of low prices is an intentional price war if it follows a period of high prices which was ended intentionally by one of the firms in the market (the price war leader)....

We consider bargaining games under the assumption that bargainers are loss averse, i.e. experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by imposing the self-supporting condition on a solution. Given a bargaining game, we...

Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus ona new condition: "update monotonicity" for preference rules. Although many so-called impossibilitytheorems for the choice rules are based on -or related to- monotonicity conditions, this...

Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept arediscussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closerto an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requiresfurther...